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While conscientious objection in healthcare is becoming increasingly studied, the legislative 
implementation of the principle is often without definition, leading to the question ‘what is 
conscientious objection?’  As this article will demonstrate, it is useful to reconceptualise 
conscientious objection as ‘resistance’ to dominant discourses and understandings in 
society, which have been internalised and co-opted as a way of acting as a ‘safety-valve’ for 
individualised dissent, as well as reinforcing perceptions of freedom, choice and tolerance in 
liberal democratic society.  This non-normative assessment of conscientious objection 
therefore seeks to provide a framework for understanding why certain forms of resistance 
may be considered conscientious and some may not, before then applying this 




Conscientious objection in healthcare is a concept that is well established and legally 
recognised.  In 2010, the Council of Europe’s Parliamentary Assembly recognised the right to 
conscientious objection in healthcare, stating in a Resolution that Member States should 
‘guarantee the right to conscientious objection in relation to participation in the medical 
procedure in question’2.  However, legislation enshrining a right to conscientious objection 
does not define it, and Campbell states that conscientious objection in healthcare can be 
defined as a refusal to perform, participate in or contribute to a certain procedure in a 
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personal capacity on the basis of a belief that there is a moral obligation to not perform that 
procedure3.  Yet is such an understanding sufficient?  Are all refusals to perform based on a 
moral imperative conscientious?  How do we determine what objections are conscientious, 
and which are unacceptable? 
 
The purpose of this article is to examine this question in more detail, and thereby 
reconceptualise conscientious objection in terms of ‘resistance’.  By using a Foucauldian 
framework in which dominant discourses are linked to power, it will be demonstrated that 
conscientious objection constitutes resistance against a dominant way of thinking within 
society, and as such, cannot be divorced from the social, cultural and historical context in 
which that act takes place.  To put it another way, what may be considered a ‘conscientious’ 
objection in one state or culture may be considered unconscionable behaviour in another.  
The intention, therefore, is not to make any normative statements about conscientious 
objection, and whether it should be permissible, but to provide an explanation as to why 
some types of behaviour may be considered as ‘conscientious’, and why some may not.  
Finally, this analytic framework will then be applied to debates over medical procedures that 
may be considered socially accepted, such as abortion, and those largely considered 
abhorrent, such as female circumcision. 
 
2. Networks of Power, Networks of Resistance: A Framework for Conceptualising 
Conscientious Objection 
 
Before entering into the discussion of conscientious objection as a form of resistance, it is 
first necessary to expand upon the concepts of power and resistance as defined by Foucault.  
For Foucault, the purpose of his work on power was to ‘determine what are, in their 
mechanisms, effects, their relations, the various power-apparatuses that operate at various 
levels of society…’4.  The intent, therefore, was not to provide for a theory of power, but a 
way of analysing power relations5.  Foucault determined that it was not useful to think of 
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power within society functioning in a ‘juridical’ sense, in which power is something that can 
be possessed, bartered and transferred6, but as a relational force.  ‘Power is not something 
divided between those who have it and hold it exclusively, and those who do not have it and 
are subject to it. Power must…be analysed as something that circulates…exercised through 
networks’7.  As Downing states, the effects of power are ‘not exercised from a single vantage 
point, but are mobile [and] multivalent’8, indicating that power is something multilateral, 
exercised and influencing in different ways.  Legal power, for example, may operate through 
the judge sentencing the convicted to a seven-year prison sentence.  But this power is not 
held by a judge, the power to solely incarcerate or to punish, to release or pardon.  Instead, 
this power is something exercised by a judge by virtue of their office.  This type of power can 
be referred to as ‘governmentality’ – the ‘ensemble formed by the institutions, procedures, 
analyses, and reflection, the calculations and tactics that allow the exercise of this very 
specific, albeit complex form of power’9.  Butler states that ‘marked by a diffuse set of 
strategies and tactics, governmentality gains its meaning and purpose from no single source, 
no unified sovereign subject’10.  In other words, the power exercised by a judge comes from a 
multitude of different sources, interacting in such a way as to make that exercise of power 
possible.  The judge cannot choose an individual at random, and order their imprisonment.  
The judge instead is empowered through the legitimacy granted to their actions through the 
creation of legislation that states that the committal of certain offences will result in 
incarceration.  Yet, this legislation may have arisen as the result of changing social norms, in 
which a certain form of conduct was perceived to be undesirable, and therefore should be 
punished.  In turn, the convincing case brought by prosecutors may have convinced a jury 
that a guilty verdict is the correct one.  The judge, acting on the findings of the jury, and 
conscious of media attention and discussions of lax sentencing, then orders the maximum 
sentence be applied.  Power has operated within a network, in which different individuals or 
institutions have in turn exercised power to influence the decisions of other individuals or 
institutions.  The relationship between state institutions such as government and groups or 
individuals is multi-directional, including the relations between government and social 
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institutions, or relations concerning political sovereignty11.  Governmentality then asks ‘by 
what means, mechanisms, procedures, instruments, tactics, techniques, technologies and 
vocabularies is authority constituted and rule accomplished?’12.   
 
Central to power is knowledge.  Or, to put it another way, that ‘knowledge and power are 
integrated with one another…it is not possible for power to be exercised without knowledge, 
it is impossible for knowledge not to engender power’13.  According to Foucault, ‘the delicate 
mechanisms of power cannot function unless knowledge, or rather, knowledge apparatuses, 
are formed, organized and put into circulation’14.  This means that knowledge production is 
the result of the exercise of power, and in turn, knowledge then facilitates the exercise of 
power.  To give an example, an expert panel is formed, comprising international business 
leaders.  This panel concludes that the best way to ensure growth is through the removal of 
any regulations that hinder the inexpensive manufacture of consumer goods, whether that 
relates to employment protections, health and safety regulations or customs duties.  The 
panel produces a report that is then passed to national governments.  Given the perceived 
expertise of this panel, national governments embark on a deregulation agenda.  That the 
body was made of experts gives weight to the claim that a particular policy is required – that 
policy is required, because it was made by an expert body.  The policy agenda therefore 
produces knowledge that indicates that the body in question was an expert one.  In this way, 
knowledge defines the ‘objects of such practices, codifies appropriate ways of dealing with 
them, set the aims and objectives of practice, and define the professional and institutional 
locus of authoritative agents of expertise’15.  Because this body has been deemed as ‘expert’, 
its claims are then reported as such by governments and the media.  This discourse, that 
dictates regulation is interfering with growth, becomes accepted as ‘truth’.  According to 
Shiner, ‘“truth” is centred on scientific discourse and institutions; it is central to economic 
production and political power…produced and disseminated by great economic and political 
apparatuses like the university, or media…’16.  When these ‘truths’ become accepted, they 
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become a dominant discourse, hegemonic, ‘incorporated into the common-sense way we 
interpret, live in, and understand the world’17.  They are not regularly challenged, or brought 
into question, because to do so questions the way in which the world is perceived to work.  
In twenty-first century Europe, for example, the right of women to vote is not seen as 
controversial – it is a commonly accepted and normalised practice, based on the 
understanding that men and women are equally entitled to determine who may govern.  
Similarly, throughout the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries certain discourses became 
dominant, and truths ‘accepted’, about the practice of medicine.  Medical science became 
understood not as a loose ‘group of traditions, observations, and heterogeneous practices, 
but as a corpus of knowledge that presupposed the same way of looking at things…a group 
of hypotheses about life and death, of ethical choices, of therapeutic decisions, of 
institutional regulations…’18.  In turn, doctors becomes endowed with a certain status, based 
on perceptions of ‘competence and knowledge; institutions, systems, pedagogic norms; legal 
conditions that give the right – though not without laying down certain limitations – to 
practice and to extend one’s knowledge’19.   
 
This is not to say that because a particular view or understanding is dominant within a 
society, it is completely accepted by all members of society.  To take the example of universal 
suffrage, extreme political conservatives may argue that a traditional society with clearly 
defined gender roles functions more effectively, and that men should vote but women should 
not.  As Foucault put it, ‘there is no power without potential refusal or revolt.’20  Where there 
is power, there is the possibility of resistance, for if power is the exercise of influence 
through social relations, then the exercise of power through social relations can also be used 
to resist.  Or, as Kelly puts it, since ‘power is everywhere in society, it means that resistance 
is everywhere too’21.  To give another example, a student is talking in class.  The teacher 
ordering the student to stop talking is an exercise of power; rather than stop, however, the 
student talks more loudly than before.  This act of resistance also constitutes an exercise of 
power.  Nevertheless, although all actors within a network may exercise power, the ability to 
exercise power effectively is inegalitarian, and some nodes are more able to influence than 
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others due to privileged positions22 - in this instance, the loud student may be sent out of the 
room, or to the principal.  Again, resistance like power is relational; ‘the specific character of 
resistance is itself influenced by the power it opposes’23.  In other words, resistance is a 
response to the exercise of power.  This resistance can be characterised as ‘macro’ or ‘micro’ 
resistance.  Macro resistance refers to great ruptures, or fundamental shifts in networks of 
power.  Examples of this may include the French Revolution, for example, and the (at least 
temporary) removal of unelected Kings in favour of a Republic, or the changes in Russia 
post-1917 creating a Communist state.  A less extreme example may include the repeal of a 
highly contentious piece of legislation, such as the apparent repeal of the Data Retention 
Directive24 through a declaration by the Court of Justice of the European Union that as a 
result of the disproportionate nature of the Directive, it was therefore invalid and 
unenforceable25.  Micro resistance, however, is resistance on a more local, individual level.  
This could be considered as the simple act of saying ‘no’.  It could include the child refusing 
to go to bed at the hour decided by the child’s parents, or the woman who refuses to turn off 
her mobile phone in the cinema.  They are acts of resistance on an individual level, indicating 
a refusal to be bound by, or at the least a refusal to accept, a particular command, decision or 
law.  As Kelly states, these are acts of resistance that do constitute an exercise of power, in 
the form of a refusal to act or insistence upon acting by the individual that nevertheless 
present ‘no overall conflict with the network of power relations’26.  The child refusing to go 
to bed does not successfully challenge the understanding that it is the parents that make the 
rules concerning the conduct of the child.  The woman refusing to turn off the phone does 
not result in a change of dominant discourse and social norm that phones should be 
switched off in movie theatres.  Localised, micro-resistance can not only result in 
disciplinary action based in the existing networks of power (the child is grounded, the 
woman ‘socially shamed’ or even asked to leave the cinema), but can also be co-opted, or 
factored into the existing networks of power.  One example includes punk music – initially 
considered a social ill and associated with moral panics due to its ‘proclamation and 
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embrace of discord…Early punk sought to tear apart consumer goods, royalty, and 
sociability; it sought to destroy the idols of the bourgeoisie’27.  However, by 2014, punk is 
just another musical and social sub-culture, one of many different forms of performance 
associated with an acceptable frame of teenage rebellion or social commentary – ‘a relatively 
stable niche in which there is no overall conflict with the network of power relations’28.  In 
this way, resistance can be accepted and factored into existing discourses, allowing for a 
form of societal ‘safety valve’, in which individual acts of resistance prevent larger, more 
concentrated and organised forms of resistance that threaten the existing structures and 
discourses. 
 
3.  Conscientious Objection as a Form of Resistance: The Challenging of Dominant 
Discourses in the Provision of Healthcare in Contentious Fields 
 
Based on the preceding section, this section will seek to demonstrate that a useful way of 
conceiving conscientious objection is as a form of micro-resistance.  Groups or individuals 
choose to say ‘no’ in response to the exercise of power that comes through the existence of 
social norms or overarching understandings of the world apparent in dominant discourses, 
as well as hegemonic discourses concerning medical treatment and the medical profession 
specifically.  The interaction between these discourses, in which dominant social attitudes 
become buttressed by a discourse of medical and scientific rationalism then create the 
conditions in which resistance not only occurs, but can be co-opted as an acceptable form of 
dissent.   
 
3.1. Choice, Rights, Freedom: Societal Discourses Impacting Upon Medical Treatment 
 
The discourse, and indeed academic discussion, of conscientious objection in healthcare 
generally takes place within the framework of Western liberal democracy.  As such, there are 
certain norms and principles that emanate from this system of government that are so 
commonly accepted to the extent that they are taken for granted as the way in which the 
world functions.  However, by exploring them in more detail, it may help in the 
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conceptualisation of conscientious objection.  In the system of liberal democracy, ‘the 
freedom of individuals is regarded as a critical yardstick for governmental action’29.  
Freedom therefore constitutes a hegemonic characteristic in liberal democracies, often 
juxtaposed against those nations or political systems in which citizens are not considered to 
‘be free’.  In this conception, ‘individual freedom represents a technical condition of rational 
government’30.  Limitations on freedom, therefore, must serve a rational function, such as to 
protect the freedom of others – incarcerating those who have committed violent crime, so as 
to prevent them committing further crimes against citizens.  The limits of these freedoms, 
within a liberal system, are ostensibly those decided by citizens through the act of 
representative or participatory democracy, based on the dominant social norms of that time 
– ‘society comes first, law and government later’31.  Associated, or even interlinked with this 
notion of individual freedom within a system of liberal democracy are the notions of choice 
and rights.  Particularly in the light of the economic policies pursued by Thatcher and Reagan 
in the 1980s, conceptions of liberty have been associated with market-based logics and the 
right to choose.  In particular, as Miller and Rose indicate, since the 1980s the importance 
and general social acceptance of the value of individual freedom, personal choice and self-
fulfilment has become apparent32.   
 
Yet how does this apply to conscientious objection in healthcare?  The answer is that 
conscientious objection must be understood in the context of the dominant discourses 
within the society in which it is assessed.  As literature in the field of conscientious objection 
in healthcare indicates, the discourses of freedom, choice and rights features prominently.  
Antommaria refers to the framing of debates over certain medical treatments as adjudicating 
between ‘patients’ right to legally available medical treatments versus health care providers’ 
right to refuse to participate in any intervention they find morally objectionable’33.  Wicclair 
uses a similar rights-based discourse, discussing ‘two important rights at stake: rights of 
conscience and a right of access to healthcare without undue burdens’34.  Vischer in turn 
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analyses the interaction between rights of access ‘versus’ institutional identity as it pertains 
to the provision of emergency contraception in the form of the morning-after pill35, whereas 
in discussing new technologies associated with childbirth, Robertson refers to ‘procreative 
freedom’, or ‘the freedom to reproduce or not to reproduce’36.  Indeed, with the 
advancement of women’s rights and feminism as a movement, the ability of a woman to 
choose what happens with her body, including the right to decide to terminate a pregnancy, 
is increasingly an accepted concept in liberal democracies.  The passing of the Abortion Act 
1967 in the UK, referred to as ‘liberal’ by Cook and Dickens37, and decisions such as Roe v 
Wade in the US38 marked the beginning of the liberalisation of laws relating to abortion, 
indicating according to Cook et al. that liberal democracies have been reforming their 
abortion laws ‘in conformity with human rights principles respectful of women's human 
rights to life, health, and reproductive self-determination’39.  Supporting this view is the 
Canadian case of R v Morgentaler40, in which the Chief Justice of Canada stated that forcing a 
woman to carry a foetus to term ‘unless she meets certain criteria unrelated to her own 
priorities and aspirations, is a profound interference with a woman’s body and thus a 
violation of security of the person’41.  It is submitted that this statement effectively fits 
within a discourse of freedom, choice and rights, and has been influenced by the dominant 
discourse in that particular society – as such, the law has followed the development or 
change in networks of power in that social context. 
 
In a society in which the dominant or accepted ‘truth’ is that there must be respect for this 
personal autonomy, the right of a woman to choose what happens to her body, then 
conscientious objection in this context is the rejection of that ‘truth’, and resistance to the 
exercise of power that states that this freedom to choose should be respected by medical 
practitioners.  After all, as Savulescu has infamously stated, ‘what should be provided to 
patients is defined by law…if people are not prepared to offer legally permitted, efficient, and 
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beneficial care to a patient because it conflicts with their values, they should not be 
doctors’42.  While perhaps something of a strong position, it nevertheless reflects the 
dominant discourse in liberal democracies that the right of individuals to choose (whether 
as patients or as consumers) either should not be interfered with, or alternatively, should be 
interfered with only to the extent that is necessary to achieve another socially-desirable goal.  
Conscientious objection to the provision of certain medical procedures is resistance to this 
discourse.  Does it mean that resistance in this form is free from dominant discourses or 
power relations that influence the decision making of individuals?  The answer is no; 
instead, it means that the individual resisting that discourse is nevertheless subject to 
another discourse that through a process of internalisation, becomes the accepted ‘truth’.  
This can be referred to as ‘ethics’ in the Foucauldian sense, ‘the elaboration of a form of self-
relation that enables the individual to constitute himself as the subject of moral conduct’43.  
This may be the result of the imposition or influence of an external code, which is then 
subsumed as part of the identity of that individual.  One example of this is religious codes, 
which appear to have an influence on the decision of individuals to resist accepted medical 
practices.  In an analysis of reasons why pharmacists in the State of Nevada were unwilling 
to distribute emergency contraceptives or medical abortifacients, ‘religion emerged as a 
significant predictor…Evangelical Protestant, Catholic and “Other Religious” pharmacists 
were significantly less likely to dispense medications while non-religious pharmacists were 
significantly more willing’44.  As Curlin et al. discuss, many of the areas of medical practice 
that clinicians may object to are prominently those that concern the sexual and reproductive 
health of women (end of life issues being the noticeable exception), and those objection to 
the provision of those services predominantly identify as religious – and it is those same 
physicians ‘who are most likely to be asked to act against their consciences are the ones who 
are most likely to say that physicians should not have to do so’45.  Here we see that a 
predominant conflict is between the dominant discourse within society at a general level, in 
terms of the social norms and accepted cultural practices – i.e. freedom, and the right to 
choose, and that of a rival node within that social network, namely the religious code 
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constituting part of the clinician’s identity that dictates a refusal to accept that socially 
accepted ‘truth’.  They choose to resist that influence or exercise of power that compels them 
to perform a particular service, on the basis that it conflicts with their self-constitution as a 
moral actor based on the internalization of a religious code.  Yet it is not sufficient to base an 
understanding of conscientious objection on the level of society alone; we must also consider 
the communities of practice in the field of medicine, and the dominant discourses that 
operate within that network. 
 
Doctors, and indeed nurses, pharmacists, and medical researchers all constitute what can be 
referred to as communities of practice46.  A community of practice is a group of people 
engaged in a particular activity that frequently communicate with each other about these 
activities.  Doctors, through the process of professionalisation in the late nineteenth century, 
emerged as such a group47.  Furthermore, doctors in particular function as an epistemic 
community.  An epistemic community, according to Haas, constitutes ‘a network of 
professionals with recognised expertise and competence in a particular domain and an 
authoritative claim to policy relevant knowledge within that domain or issue-area…’48.  As 
mentioned in the second section of this article, power, and by extension policy development, 
depends substantially upon these perceptions of expertise and the production of knowledge.  
As a community of actors with an ostensible shared purpose and claims to expert 
knowledge, medical practitioners as a group are able to influence both public perceptions of 
medical treatment, as well as specific laws concerning medical practice.  Again, using the 
example of the nineteenth century, doctors as an epistemic community were instrumental in 
the restriction of access to abortion in the UK and the increase in criminal sanctions for 
performing the procedure49.  In turn, doctors were consulted and actively involved in the 
reframing of abortion in the twentieth century as an issue about the healing of women, and 
the permissibility of abortion for therapeutic reasons50.  However, just as the medical 
profession is able to influence discourses regarding medical treatment, so too is the medical 
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profession influenced by dominant discourses pervading society at a particular time.  As a 
result, what constitutes proper medical treatment or ‘acceptable science’ is largely 
dependent on the social and cultural conditions in which that treatment takes place.  For 
example, during the late nineteenth and early-to-mid twentieth century, the study of 
eugenics was commonly accepted as acceptable science, in which some races were deemed 
to be degenerate and a threat to the preservation of mankind51.  The common acceptance of 
these theories at a social level was influenced by the scientific discourses of ‘expert men’, 
which in turn reinforced the claims to expertise that those men possessed.  The common 
acceptance of these theories, as we are well aware, has led to some of the greatest atrocities 
of the twentieth century.  As Foucault argued, this discourse maintained that ‘the death of 
the bad race, of the inferior race (or the degenerate or the immoral) is something that will 
make life in general healthier: healthier and purer’52.  When such a discourse becomes 
socially accepted, it can then be used to justify medical treatments and procedures such as 
sterilisation, or worse.  Nevertheless, contemporary scientists would largely agree that 
eugenics as understood in the early twentieth century amounted to no more than ‘pseudo-
science’, bearing little relation to what is currently understood as scientific thought.  This 
demonstrates that as with more general views on society and how society should be 
governed, medical discourses too are subject to change – what is considered scientific now 
may not be considered scientific tomorrow.  Indeed, science, as with social attitudes, are 
changeable, and dependent upon the culture and dominant discourses in which it exists. 
 
3.2.  Conscientious Objection Conceptualised and the Co-Option of Resistance 
 
The previous sections have determined that one way of conceptualising conscientious 
objection is as a form of resistance against dominant discourses, either at a general societal 
level, or alternatively, within the context of the discourse of medical professionals as a 
community.  It is submitted that by conceptualising conscientious objection in such a 
manner, it is possible to then consider the bounds of conscientious objection with regard to 
power relations in order to determine what may constitute conscientious objection and 
what may not.  As demonstrated by the above subsections, as discourses may change with 
changes in society, so too may what constitutes conscientious objection.  This may be 
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expressed in the following way: there must be something to resist, to necessitate resistance.  
Another way of phrasing this is that there must be something to object to for conscientious 
objection to be necessary.  To provide an example, with the professionalisation of doctors in 
the nineteenth century, abortion was instrumentalised as a way of building a perception of 
elite status and ethical standing53.  Within the epistemic shift and development discourse in 
which abortion was deemed socially unacceptable, a doctor refusing to provide that service 
would not be engaged in conscientious objection.  There would be no resistance, as they 
were operating within the dominant discourse, reinforcing the existing power structures in 
which abortion was prohibited.  In turn, when dominant social discourses changed, 
reflecting social norms concerning freedom, individualism and the right to choose, 
approaches to abortion were liberalised.  The refusal to participate in what became 
liberalised and both socially acceptable and legally possible constitutes an act of resistance, 
as it challenges, albeit on an individual level, those existing power structures and the 
discourse that such action is permissible.  To provide a different example, let us take the 
example of female circumcision, also commonly referred to as female genital mutilation.  
Female genital mutilation causes significant emotional responses, and is generally viewed 
with abhorrence in liberal democracies.  The World Health Organisation has referred to the 
practice as reflecting ‘deep rooted inequality between the sexes, and constitutes an extreme 
form of discrimination against women’54.  In the UK, the practice is explicitly illegal as a 
result of the Female Genital Mutilation Act 2003 in England, Wales and Northern Ireland, 
and the Prohibition of Female Genital Mutilation (Scotland) Act 2005, both of which not only 
prohibit the practice in the UK, but also for UK nationals to perform the procedure outside 
the UK55, carrying a maximum penalty of fourteen years.  It is highly unlikely therefore that a 
doctor refusing to perform the procedure in the UK would be regarded as conscientiously 
objecting – the social norm and dominant discourse stating that such conduct is 
reprehensible, and to object to it would not be viewed as conscientious, merely refraining 
from doing something society has deemed it wrong to do.  That person has chosen not to 
engage in conduct considered sufficiently serious that engaging in it would be considered 
illegal.  In comparison, the individual who attempts to perform that procedure can be 
                                                        
53 Thomson, ‘Abortion Law and Professional Boundaries’, 195. 
54 World Health Organisation, Eliminating Female Genital Mutilation: An Interagency Statement, (Geneva: WHO 
Press 2008), 1 
55 Female Genital Mutilation Act 2003, s.4 and Prohibition of Female Genital Mutilation (Scotland) Act 2005 s.4 
respectively 
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considered as engaging in resistance.  It is a rejection of the liberal democratic discourse 
concerning the act as a criminal offence, and a statement that a practice should be permitted 
on the basis of the cultural beliefs that make such conduct not only acceptable, but important 
as a right of passage into ‘womanhood’56.  Indeed, in countries in which this practice is 
normalised, this discourse is dominant at the social level and the prevalence of female 
genital mutilation is as high as 85% of the female population57, it is the medical professional 
that refuses to perform such practices that is engaged in resistance.   
 
Yet it would cause considerable consternation (to say the least), should it be argued in a 
Western liberal democracy that the act of performing female genital mutilation would be 
considered an act of conscientious objection.  In comparison, it may well be agreed upon that 
the act of refusing to perform that act in a country in which it is commonly accepted is an act 
of conscientious objection.  Within this framework of analysis, how may those two different 
acts be distinguished?  It is submitted that the answer again lies within analysis of dominant 
discourses, and in the incorporation, or co-option of resistance.  If we return to the subject of 
abortion, with the liberalisation of laws came specific conscientious objection clauses.  For 
example, the Abortion Act 1967 states at s.4(1) that ‘no person shall be under any duty, 
whether by contract or by any statutory or other legal requirement, to participate in any 
treatment authorised by this Act to which he has a conscientious objection’.  In the US, 
according to Charo, 45 states have conscience clauses58.  As this demonstrates, resistance 
has been specifically permitted, in the case of individuals who do not want to participate in 
actions though deemed socially acceptable they nevertheless regard as undesirable or 
repugnant to their sensibilities.  Linked to the understanding that in liberal democracy 
choice, freedom and rights are commonly accepted ‘truths’, is the understanding that 
freedom and choice involves respecting the rights and beliefs of others, which can be 
considered a discourse of tolerance.  The incorporation of resistance in this context is the 
acceptance of the right of individuals to also choose not to participate in certain procedures.  
Wicclair, for example, refers to conscientious objection being generally accepted in the 
                                                        
56 See P Stanley Yoder, Papa Ousmane Camara, and Baba Soumaoro, Female Genital Cutting and Coming of Age 
in Guinea (Conakry, Guinea, December 1999), 14, Conakry, Guinea. 
57 World Health Organisation, Eliminating Female Genital Mutilation: An Interagency Statement, 6, in which it 
stated that this practice has near universal prevalence (above 85%) in seven countries, high prevalence 
(between 60-85%) in four countries, and medium prevalence (30-40%) in seven countries 
58 R Alta Charo, ‘The Celestial Fire of Conscience — Refusing to Deliver Medical Care’, The New England Journal 
of Medicine 352, no. 24 (2005): 2471. 
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medical community, referring to the American Medical Association guidelines stating that 
medical schools should have mechanisms in place for allowing students to be excused from 
activities that violate students’ religious or ethical beliefs59.  Similarly, many authors on 
conscientious objection argue within a discourse of tolerance, favouring the right of 
individual practitioners to opt out of providing treatments they oppose, generally so long as 
they refer the patient to someone who will provide that treatment60.  Such an approach 
allows for conscientious objection to act as a ‘safety-valve’, allowing for an individualised 
resistance to abortion that does not threaten the overall networks of power, as the 
individual ability to refuse may help to limit the potential for organised movements 
developing to attempt to challenge the existing power structures in which abortion is 
tolerated.  So long as there is referral, meaning that the individualised resistance does not 
impact upon the freedom or choice of others, then this is to be tolerated within a liberal 
democratic framework.  Even Savulescu, who voiced a strong opinion about conscientious 
objection nevertheless argued that where there are a sufficient number of practitioners 
willing and able to provide a service ‘there is an argument for allowing a few to object out’61.  
This acceptance of resistance, in the form of conscientious objection, therefore fits within the 
discourse of choice and freedom that is hegemonic within liberal democratic societies.  
These forms of resistance are permitted, because they allow the exercise of choice in a way 
that does not unduly limit the choices of others.  They choose not to act, in their form of 
resistance.  The person who performs a female circumcision, in comparison, is perceived to 
act in a way that limits choice, or acts in a way demonstrating a significant power imbalance, 
with women perceived as victims, not patients62.  By the standards of contemporary liberal 
democracies, this means that performing female circumcision cannot be conscientious.  In a 
country such as Burkina Faso, for example, where the prevalence of female circumcision was 
estimated to be 73.0% in 200163, it is the practitioner who refuses to perform the procedure 
who resists.  By the standards of liberal democracy, given the perception of the woman as 
victim, deprived of choice, the resistance constitutes conscientious objection.  By the 
standards of Malian society, in comparison, this practice is considered as acceptable and 
                                                        
59 Wicclair, ‘Is Conscientious Objection Incompatible with a Physician’s Professional Obligations?’, 180. 
60 See for example Vischer, ‘Individual Rights vs. Institutional Identity’, 74–77; Mark R Wicclair, ‘Conscientious 
Objection in Medicine’, Bioethics 14, no. 3 (2000): 206; Adrienne Asch, ‘Two Cheers for Conscience Exceptions’, 
Hastings Center Report November-December (2006): 11. 
61 Savulescu, ‘Conscientious Objection in Medicine’, 296. 
62 World Health Organisation, Eliminating Female Genital Mutilation: An Interagency Statement, 1 
63 UNICEF, ‘Female Genital Mutilation/Cutting: A statistical exploration’, UNICEF Press (2005), 35 
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something that should continue, with 80% of women believing the practice should 
continue64, with 69.9% of women and 63.2% of men citing religious demands as the 
reason65.  In this context, the practitioner may not be perceived as a conscientious objector, 
but someone who interferes with religious requirements.  Similar arguments can be found 
within the European Union, and demonstrate that conceptualisations of conscientious 
objection cannot be divorced from conceptualisations of power.  For example, post-
Communist Poland saw an increase in the influence of the Catholic Church in political 
matters, coupled with a conservative yet neoliberal social policy pursued by successive 
governments.  Abortion, which was once legally sanctioned, became increasingly restricted, 
and subject to a conscience clause that permitted a doctor to refuse to perform the 
procedure66.  In a telling interview by Mishtal with a doctor speaking about the restriction to 
abortions, a doctor stated that ‘We received the news of the [Conscience] Clause with great 
joy…[many of us] felt that our conscience was being violated because, truth be told, everyone 
who participated in abortions, or who assisted, be it a doctor or a nurse or an 
anesthesiologist, acted unethically’67.  Mishtal argues that the use of the conscience clause in 
Poland is so far-reaching as to be considered ‘systemic’ rather than ‘individualistic’, 
significantly impacting the autonomy of women, as well as having implications for their 
health and societal position68.  Similarly, in Italy where nearly 70% of gynaecologists refuse 
to perform abortion procedures, and the number of doctors relying on conscience clauses in 
this context rose from 58.7% to 69.2% in four years69, within this community of practice it 
may be said that the refusal is a systemic rather than individual one.  In this context, then, it 
is the discourse that abortion should not be permitted that becomes dominant – in a general, 
unified system of resistance, the dominant discourse is changed from one in which abortion 
is accepted, yet an individual may refuse to perform it, to one in which an abortion is morally 
unacceptable and will not be performed by the majority of practitioners.  The act is not one 
of resistance, but a reinforcing of the dominant discourse that pervades that particular 
power relationship, influencing the decisions made by medical practitioners, or the ability of 
                                                        
64 ibid., 42 
65 ibid., 44 
66 Joanna Z. Mishtal, ‘Matters of “Conscience”: The Politics of Reproductive Healthcare in Poland’, Medical 
Anthropology Quarterly 23, no. 2 (2009): 168. 
67 Ibid., 169. 
68 Ibid., 177. 
69 Christina Zampas and Ximena Andión-Ibañez, ‘Conscientious Objection to Sexual and Reproductive Health 
Services: International Human Rights Standards and European Law and Practice’, European Journal of Health 
Law 19, no. 3 (2012): 248. 
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women to choose whether to terminate a pregnancy.  If conscientious rejection is 
conceptualised as resistance, then in these instances where the dominant discourse is one of 
the unacceptable nature of such a procedure, it is those doctors that insist on performing 
those procedures that may be considered as those acting in resistance to the discourse in 
which those procedures were performed, as the above doctor stated ‘unethically’.  The 
doctor who refuses to perform the procedure is not engaged in conscientious objection, 
because the existing networks of power affirm and support their decision, in a system and 
discourse in which the procedure itself is considered as either illegal or inethical.  Whether 
that resistance is considered a form of ‘conscientious objection’ will ultimately be 
determined by the society in which that resistance takes place.  Conscientious objection, 
ultimately, constitutes a form of resistance that has been incorporated within the existing 
networks of power, as they exist at a certain point in time in a determined geographical or 
cultural location.  Where actions serve instead to reinforce those existing power relations, or 
to exercise power in line with those dominant discourses, those actions cannot be 
considered as resistance. 
 
4. Concluding Remarks 
 
As this article has sought to demonstrate, conscientious objection can be reframed in terms 
of resistance, demonstrating why certain types of behaviour that are not necessarily 
condoned by society nevertheless are permitted.  In a liberal democracy, in which discourses 
of freedom, choice and tolerance are dominant and form the basis of the technology of 
government, permitting acts of individual resistance on the basis of a moral or ethical belief 
may be permitted both as a way of reinforcing that perception of societal tolerance, as well 
as acting as a safety-valve that prevents larger, more organised forms of resistance that 
challenge existing networks of power.  The limit to those resistances, and their acceptance as 
‘conscientious’ are ultimately determined by the societal, cultural and historical contexts in 
which they are exercised, meaning that what is permissible as an act of conscientious 
objection in one context may be considered as completely unacceptable in another.  The 
extent to which these acts of resistance are considered conscientious will ultimately be 
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